Against Moral Responsibility is an assault on the moral responsibility system: a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from Aristotle to the present day. Such an assault might seem foolhardy, or at best quixotic. But in fact, the results from extensive psychological, sociological, and biological studies have caused major problems for defend-
ers of moral responsibility, and there are serious fl aws in the moral responsibility system. Furthermore, the philosophical defenders of moral responsibility -though they are numerous, imaginative, insightful, and committed -are in no position to offer a unifi ed defense of the moral responsibility citadel. Instead, in their reactions to the scientifi c advances challenging the moral responsibility system, philosophers have proposed a great variety of different and confl icting defenses of moral responsibility.
There is such controversy among the defenders of moral responsibility that moral responsibility abolitionists might carry the day by sitting back safely while the defenders demolish one another ' s arguments.
The basic claim of this book is that -all the extraordinary and creative efforts of contemporary philosophers notwithstanding -moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientifi c system. Moral responsibility was a comfortable fi t among gods and miracles and mysteries, but the deeper scientifi c understanding of human behavior and the causes shaping human character leaves no room for moral responsibility. The second claim is that when we look carefully at the moral responsibility system and at what would actually remain when that system is abolished, it is clear that what we really want -natural non miraculous human free will, moral judgments, warm and meaningful personal relationships, creative abilities, and the opportunity to make our own decisions and exercise effective viii Preface control -can survive and fl ourish without moral responsibility, and that what is lost -" just deserts, " blame and punishment, righteous retribution, special reward -we are better off without. Finally, there is the question of whether it is actually possible to reject the moral responsibility system and replace it with something else. Obviously, that will not be easy on either a personal or societal level, but the fi nal claim of the book is that it is socially and psychologically possible and that we are already making progress toward that goal. In short, the total abolition of moral responsibility is both desirable and possible. Twenty-fi ve years ago I had an opportunity to write a review of Robert Kane ' s early book, Free Will and Values ( 1985 ) . Before starting to read the book in preparation for writing the review, I was prepared to scoff: just another in a long line of failed libertarian fantasies, I assumed. Reading only a few pages put a quick end to my scoffi ng; and though I did not stay to pray, it was soon clear that Bob had developed a libertarian account that was something entirely new: rigorous, never straying anywhere close to miracles or mysteries, carefully argued, scientifi cally informed. Though we have never been able to reach agreement on the basic issues -Robert Kane remains a resourceful defender of the moral responsibility system that this In recent visits to Tallahassee, I have had the pleasure of luncheon discussions with Randy Clarke, Al Mele, and Mike McKenna; those lively luncheons not only were a great pleasure, but also gave me a much clearer picture of several key issues (I fear they will conclude that my picture is still quite muddled, but at least it is clearer than it was).
I have developed the strongest attacks I can muster against a great variety of defenders of moral responsibility. But it will be obvious to any philosopher that it is the extraordinary richness, variety, and rigor of the arguments in favor of moral responsibility that have been the greatest stimulus to my own work, and I am indebted to all of the philosophers who have made the current debate so lively and interesting.
Recently, I completed my second decade in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Youngstown State University. Youngstown, deep in the heart of the northeast Ohio rust belt, is not a scenic paradise, but if you scratch beneath the surface, it is a beautiful city with beautiful people. My students are from every ethnic background, the children of every wave of immigrants that arrived to work in the now-abandoned steel mills. They do not always have splendid educational backgrounds, but they have a tremendous respect for education and a remarkable capacity for hard work: often taking classes after fi nishing a midnight factory shift, then getting kids fed and off to school, checking on an aging parent, and still arriving in class eager to learn. For twenty years, they have made my classes stimulating, enjoyable, fresh, and profoundly satisfying. We are also fortunate to have a large and energetic group of superb majors: on a recent Friday afternoon, more than thirty of them converged on a local coffee shop for several hours of reading and discussing John Locke ' s views on religious tolerance; there would have been more, had they been able to rearrange their demanding job schedules. I am especially indebted to the students in my recent free will seminar, who probed that question with great passion and deep insight.
I am particularly lucky to be working with such stimulating, productive, and congenial colleagues. Every person in the department is I am grateful to all of the wonderful people who have made it possible to complete this book and helped me avoid many mistakes, though they deserve neither praise nor reward for their generous efforts. The many fl aws that remain in the book are the result of my arrogance and obstinacy, for which I sincerely apologize, and for which I deserve no blame.
